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ARGUMENT 
The Governmental Immunity Act is designed to shield the Government from liability 
resulting from injuries or property damage caused by natural conditions or natural phenomena 
on public land. Nelson Bv and Through Stuckman v. Salt Lake City. 919 P.2d 568, 574 (Utah 
1996). This case presents a different situation. The Act, as submitted by Appellant, is not 
designed to protect the Government's negligent conduct in placing or permitting the public to be 
exposed to harm from natural occurrences. The lower court's entry of summary judgment against 
Appellant is, in whole, erroneous, and is squarely before this Court. 
POINT I. 
APPELLANT HAS ADDRESSED ALL MATERIAL ISSUES ON APPEAL 
Appellees have suggested that Appellant failed to address the issue of immunity from 
injuries caused by a natural condition. UDOT Brief at page 9. Alta Brief at page 6. The issue 
on appeal whether Appellant's injuries were "proximately caused by a negligent act or omission 
of an employee committed within the scope of employment except if the injury arises out of in 
connection with, or results from ... (11) any natural condition on publicly owned or controlled 
lands,..." as codified at Section 63-30-10, U.C.A. was sufficiently raised, but is obscured by the 
parties' differing interpretations of statutory definitions. 
The lower court concluded, as a matter of law, that "the" avalanche is "a natural 
phenomenon, it is certainly a natural condition of the land..."1 Transcript of hearing on 
1
 The lower court's usage of the term "the" must be intended to relate to a specific 
avalanche in this case. If the court spoke in terms of the first avalanche, its legal conclusion that 
it was a natural disaster is erroneous. This is Appellant's assumption on appeal. If "the" is 
1 
Motions for Summary Judgment. Rec. at 294. Page 16. lines 10-11. Appellant has no dispute 
with the statutory definition that an avalanche is a "natural phenomenon" as defined by Section 
53-2-102(8), U.C.A. It is also undisputed that Appellant was injured by a wholly separate and 
unrelated second avalanche. It is further without dispute that the Appellees actually directed and 
placed Appellant in harm's way by stopping his vehicle under a known avalanche slide area. 
Medara Statement. Rec. at 216. This resulted in a "disaster" of the governments' own making. 
The first avalanche occurred prior to Appellant's arrival in the area, and the Governmental 
entities had already begun clean up efforts of the snow that spilled on the road. It is, therefore, 
implausible that the proximate cause of Appellant's injury "[arose] out of, in connection with, 
or results from: (11) any natural condition on publicly owned or controlled lands..." U.C.A., 
§63-3-10(11). The question is one of causation. 
It does not follow that Appellant's injuries were proximately caused by a static, natural 
condition existing on land simply because the Government was involved in the clearing of snow 
from the road further ahead. The proximate cause of Appellant's injuries did not arise out of, 
was not connected with, and did not result from the snow in the road further ahead. This was 
the analysis used in Nelson, supra, where the natural condition may have been the actual cause, 
but not the proximate cause of the injury. Id. at 574. This case is even more compelling to 
impose liability, since the "natural condition" of the snow being cleared was neither the 
describing the second avalanche, the court is correct that it caused a natural disaster, but is not 
a proximate cause of injury under the case of Nelson. 919 P.2d 568 (Utah 1996). 
2 
proximate nor actual cause of injury to Appellant. To hold otherwise would abrogate this Court's 
holding in Nelson. 
Appellees' argument that the issue of "natural condition" was not addressed by Appellant 
begs the question. It is the interpretation of these terms [natural condition, natural phenomenon, 
natural disaster] that is at the heart of the Governments' claim of immunity. However, it 
remains that the Appellant was simply not injured by a natural condition. 
a) Natural Condition is a static or peaceable condition on land. 
This issue was briefed and argued in the lower court and the issue is before this Court 
on appeal. The argument was presented, both here and below, as to what classification and state 
of existence applied to the first avalanche, arid in light of this Court's holding in Nelson By and 
Through Stuckman v. Salt Lake City. 919 P.2d 568 (Utah 1996), concerning whether the child's 
drowning was caused by the natural condition or the Government's negligence. 
Appellant has more than adequately raised the immunity issue Appellees contend was 
omitted on appeal as to "natural condition." The issue is obscured beneath definitional 
bloodshed. The simple truth is that the lower court incorrectly lumped an "avalanche" into all 
three statutory categories, as it concerned the first avalanche, and extended immunity without any 
evidence to distinguish or elevate a "condition" to "phenomenon" to "disaster." 
It is illogical to classify an earthquake, storm, flood, fire, or epidemic as "natural 
conditions" on public lands. It is submitted that the Legislature considered "natural conditions" 
as "static" or peaceably existing, whereas phenomena are more "dynamic" in nature. Similarly, 
rocks and dirt are natural conditions on land, but become the natural phenomenon of a "landslide" 
3 
when put into motion. "Natural phenomenon" means any earthquake, tornado, storm, flood, 
landslide, avalanche, forest or range fire, drought, or epidemic. See §53-2-102, U.C.A. That 
definition does not include a snow pile on any public road. The opposite is true as well, where 
a phenomenon can become a natural condition. The aftermath of a landslide is rocks and dirt 
just as the outcome of an avalanche is placid snow. The question is, therefore, whether 
Appellant's injuries were caused by the first avalanche existing as a natural condition, 
phenomenon, or disaster. 
For those reasons, as previously argued and supported by Appellant's reliance on Nelson 
By and Through Stuckman v. Salt Lake City, 919 P.2d 568 (Utah 1996), the lower court erred 
in granting summary judgment by concluding that Appellant's injuries arose out of, in connection 
with, or resulted from a "natural condition." This cannot be since the "natural condition" in this 
case was static snow on the road and could not have caused injury to Appellant who was stopped 
hundreds of yards away. The only remaining theory is to conjure up a "disaster" argument 
because a natural disaster provides immunity to the Government for the active role taken in its 
management. However, this requires that the definitional requirements of a "disaster" be met, 
and strictly so. The germane argument, therefore, becomes one of whether the Government can 
make the first avalanche situation fit the specific requirements of a "disaster" as the statute 
requires. They cannot, and the lower court's ruling to that effect is clearly erroneous. 
4 
POINT n 
THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE OF WIDESPREAD THREAT OF HARM 
TO PROPERTY OR THE PUBLIC 
To support the "management of a natural disaster" claim, Appellees spend considerable 
time suggesting to this Court that the issue of "threatening to cause injury," [Section 53-2-102(2), 
U.C.A.] is the more persuasive basis for prevailing on appeal. There are, at a minimum, three 
distinct reasons for the Court to reject this approach. 
a. "Threat" of Injury 
First, the lower court did not rule that there existed any "threat of injury" arising from the 
"situation" of clearing snow from the road and directing traffic. The lower court's bench ruling 
makes it clear that it considered: 
... a disaster is a situation that causes widespread damage to property that 
results from natural phenomenon. And in the Court's view this sort of 
condition would follow in the description of "widespread damage" and would 
therefore be within the statute and would allow the immunity to the entities 
that are sued here as Defendants* [Emphasis added.] 
Transcript of hearing on Motions for Summary Judgment, Rec. at 294, Page 16, lines 12-18. 
There is nothing in the record to suggest that the lower court formed any opinion or made 
any ruling that a "threat" of injury or damage existed with respect to the first avalanche [snow 
pile]. Appellees have read into the lower court's comments from the bench that this was a 
situation threatening to cause widespread damage. No such ruling exists on the record, and 
Appellees have no evidence that can be marshalled for that contention. 
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b. Widespread Injury 
Second, and similarly, there is nothing stated by the lower court concerning actual or even 
threatened "widespread injury" (as opposed to "widespread damage"). The lower court's 
"findings" were limited to damage alone. There was no evidence of either perceived or 
threatened injury resulting from the first avalanche, which was a burden imposed on the 
Appellees. The Appellees merely argue that a risk of harm existed for a potential automobile 
accident. Such hardly rises to the level of "threatened injury or damage" as constrained by 
Appellees' arguments. 
c. Widespread Damage 
Third, there was no evidence to establish that there was any sort of "widespread damage" 
involved in the first avalanche. There simply was no damage or injury at all. The operative 
word in this setting is the term "widespread." Whether the avalanche "caused" or was 
"threatening to cause" injury or damage, such must be on the scale of "widespread" before any 
classification of a disaster can be made. The statutory definition of disaster provides: 
"Disaster" means a situation causing, or threatening to cause, widespread 
damage, [widespread] social disruption, or [widespread] injury or loss of life 
or property resulting from attack, internal disturbance, natural phenomena, 
or technological hazard. [Emphasis added, bracketed comments added]. 
See Sections 63-5A-2(4) and 53-2-102(8), ILC.A. 
Under the above definition, any threat of damage or injury must be on a widespread level 
before it will be classified as a "disaster." Appellees offered no such evidence. The mere 
inconvenience of a few passing motorists cannot be classified as "widespread." The statute has 
no allowance of immunity for simple inconvenience or frustration placed on the public. 
6 
For those reasons, Appellees' suggestion that a mere threat of injury is sufficient to sustain 
immunity in this case is lacking, at a minimum, the requisite breadth of being on the 
"widespread" scale. Obviously, until the second avalanche released, there was NEVER any actual 
or even threatened injury or damage from the first avalanche. It is only upon suggestion of 
counsel that such existed, and that should not be a proper basis to expand the scope of 
governmental immunity beyond the mandates of the Legislature and to deprive Appellant of his 
day in Court. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons and legal analysis, the decision of the lower court should be 
reversed and the matter remanded for trial on the merits. When the facts and inferences of this 
case are viewed in a light most favorable to the Appellant, reversal is mandated. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED. 
DATED this J i . day of April, 2001. 
BRAUNBERGER, BOUD^? DRAPER, P.C. 
By. 
Tad D. Draper 
Attorney for Appellant 
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